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The Paradoxical Relationship between Econometric Effectiveness and
Legal Certainty
Keith Crawford*

I. INTRODUCTION
Be it information asymmetry in banking regulation or game theory as applied to child custody in
divorce, economic theory plays an increasingly prominent role in legal scholarship.
Econometrics brings welcome empiricism to our efforts to understand the operation both of
markets and of society in general. Its application to the law, however, carries with it the risks of
failing to account for certain fundamental contradictions between econometric and legal
method.
This paper considers the problem of using econometric data to inform legal decision making,
and in particular what may be an irreconcilable clash between effective purposive law and legal
certainty. This creates problems for the judge asked to make choices based upon desired
purposive outcomes, such as achieving the best returns of creditors or having the highest
probability of recovery, in order to achieve a legally certain outcome, which is to say that the
informed observer is reasonably able to predict the result. Although this paradox is described
in the context of insolvency law, it is inherent to legal method in general rather than being
specific to this discipline.
I will do this by creating a model of a deductive judge, asked to make choices based upon
desired purposive outcomes in order to achieve a legally certain outcome. The term ‘model’ in
this case does not refer to a ‘model law’ in the traditional jurisprudential sense but rather an
economic model: an abstraction of the problem where, accepting certain assumptions to be
true, and holding all other things to be equal, we will analyse the relationship between
effectiveness and certainty.
Where I use the term “effective” I mean a test based on a quantifiably significant factor, being
something that has a measurable impact on the phenomena. Where I use the term “certain” I
mean a test that provides consistent, predictable results. The exact nature or desirability of
either legal certainty or effective social engineering through the law is beyond the scope of this
paper, as is the question of the extent to which legal reasoning is genuinely deductive. The
purpose is to demonstrate that the objectives of certainty and effectiveness are pulling in
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opposite directions: an effective law is uncertain, and a certain law is ineffective. The
lawmaker must choose between one and the other.

II. Legal Certainty
Whether a cornerstone of Dicey’s rule of law protecting individuals from an arbitrary state1, or
a principle of inherent morality in Fuller’s moral law2, whether debated, rejected, or endorsed,
the concept of legal certainty has always been a key component of any discussion of the
principles of proper law making.3 As full engagement with the worthy topic of the nature of
legal certainty is beyond the scope of this paper, it is to be hoped we can uncontroversially
summarise by suggesting that by certainty we mean that the law should be predictable. Before
we arrive at the court we should have a good idea of what the outcome will be: the murderer
will be convicted of murder, the thief convicted of theft.
“Lawyers and clients are able to predict what the outcome of a particular legal question is likely
to be in the light of previous judicial decisions. Also, once the legal rule has been established in
one case, individuals can orientate their behaviour with regard to that rule, relatively secure in
the knowledge that it will not be changed by some later court.”4
We can identify two convictions central to this notion of certainty; first, that the rule of law is
preserved, protecting us from the whims of the judiciary; second, that we can safely order our
actions according to the probable legal response:
“A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules.
In other words, the standards of the law are external standards, and, however
much it may take moral consideration into account, it does so only for the
purpose of drawing a line between such bodily motions and rests as it permits,
and such as it does not. What the law really forbids, and the only thing it forbids,
is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise.”5

1

Dicey AV, “Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution”, 10th Edition, MacMillan (London: 1968),
p187
2
Fuller L, “The Morality of Law”, New Haven (Yale University Press: 1973), p262
3
Popelier P, “Legal Certainty and Proper Law Making”, European Journal of Law Reform, 2 (2000) 321‐342, for
discussion of the role of legal certainty in law making, linking both Fuller and Dicey to European Law approaches to
certainty and contemporary problems and the notion of justified uncertainty.
4
Slapper & Kelly, “The English Legal System”, 7th Edition, Cavendish (London: 2004), p94‐95
5
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, “The Common Law”, ABA Publishing (Chicago: 2009), first published by Little Brown and
Co (1881), p74
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Encoded European Law principles like clarity, calculability and reliability6 are all the progeny of
the desire for legal certainty, as is the doctrine of stare decisis in the common law7. In
contemporary insolvency law we see a repeated focus on the creation of a “clear, predictable
and transparent insolvency process which enables both debtor and creditor to calculate the
consequences in the event insolvency actually occurs.”8 Promoting legal certainty in this form
has been a pillar of the advice given to developing nations by organisations like the IMF, the
World Bank and the OECD9, the reasoning being that in a legally certain insolvency regime,
potential creditors will be able to better evaluate the risks, encouraging economic investment
and stable development.

III. How do we achieve Legal Certainty?
Lawyers have two important techniques with which to achieve consistency between different
cases.
Deductive reasoning operates from the general to the particular, on the premise that if
individual premises are true then the conclusion cannot be false, and is central to the civil law.
It finds “its simplest and yet most powerful expression in the Aristotelian syllogism”10, a
technique that is central to the French syllogisme judicaire and via France is at the heart of civil
law11.
Reasoning by analogy, or reasoning from part to part12, looks for similar facts in other cases and
is essential to the doctrine of precedent in the common law system: “It is extremely unlikely
that judges will find an authority which corresponds precisely to the facts of the case before
them. What they have to do is find an analogous case and use its reasoning to decide the case
before them.”13 As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “It is something to show that the
consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not
been logic, it has been experience.’”14

6

Popelier P, “Legal Certainty and Proper Law Making”, European Journal of Law Reform, 2 (2000) 321‐342, 331‐333
Slapper & Kelly, p75
8
Mike Falke, “Insolvency Law Reform in Transition Economies”, Doctoral Thesis, Humboldt University Berlin,
dissertation.de
–
Verlag
im
Internet
GmbH,
(Berlin:
2003),
available
at
http://www.dissertation.de/englisch/buch.php3?buch=2101 (Accessed 13 May 2010), p38
9
See, amongst others, UNICITRAL, Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law, United Nations (New York: 2005), 10 –
‘Provision of certainty in the market to promote economic stability and growth’, World Bank “Principles for
Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems”(2005) p8 ‘Predictability’, and International Monetary Fund Legal
Department “Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures Key Issues” (1999) Part 2 ‘General Objectives and
Features of Insolvency Procedures.’
10
Slapper & Kelly, p187
11
Steiner, Eva, “French Legal Method”, Oxford University Press (Oxford: 2002), p131
12
Slapper & Kelly, p189
13
Slapper & Kelly, p190
14
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, “The Common Law”, ABA Publishing (Chicago: 2009), first published by Little Brown
and Co (1881), p1
7
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Regardless of their differences, or even the extent to which both methods are used in either or
both legal systems, what they have in common is the process of separating data into parts, or
“facts”, and testing them, whether for their logical consistency or their similarity. This quality
of separation is an important contrast to econometric method, as we shall see below. Before
we can do this there is another form of reasoning that should be considered. Holmes’ passage
quoted above continues:
“The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”15
Inductive reasoning goes from the part to the whole, the particular to the general, and is in this
sense the opposite of deductive reasoning. Some critiques of legal method as a form of
deductive reasoning focus on the role of its opposite:
“The use of inductive reasoning cannot claim the certainty inherent in the use of
deductive reasoning. The introduction of this increased element of uncertainty
is inescapable and unconscious, but it is also appropriate to note that the
determination of precedent by later courts gives the later judges scope to
consciously manipulate precedents... Thus, the apparent deductive certainty of
the use of precedent is revealed to be based on the much less certain use of
inductive reasoning and reasoning by analogy, with even the possibility of
personal views of the judges playing some part in deciding cases. This latter
factor introduces the possibility that judges do not in fact use any form of logical
reasoning to decide their cases, but simply deliver decisions on the basis of an
intuitive responses to the facts of the case and situation of the parties
involved.”16
For the purposes of a model to describe the tension between certainty and effectiveness we
shall concentrate on the judge as a creature of deductive reasoning striving to produce
objectively predictable results. Even if we were to argue that judicial reasoning were entirely
inductive, this still wouldn’t exclude impact of the desire to act or give the semblance of acting
deductively. Furthermore, as described above, the inductive judge is a legally uncertain judge
in the first place. This does open the door to the possibility that an inductive judge is free to
enact ‘effective’ law in a way a deductive judge is not, but this does no harm to our experiment.

15
16

ibid
Slapper & Kelly, p191
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IV. ECONOMETRICS AND LAW
Econometrics is the application of quantitative method to elucidate and test economic theory.
Quantification is, essentially, gathering things together and then measuring them. At its heart
is the notion that trends identified within groups can be applied to predict trends in similar
groups: if 80 of a group of 100 English men in their thirties say they will vote Conservative, then
we can predict that 80% of Englishmen in their thirties will vote Conservative.
Let us imagine that we have discovered a strong trend showing that Conservative voters were
very bad at running businesses. Let us also imagine that our judge is privy to this information.
If he is then required to decide if a business is likely to recover, and all other things being equal,
he might reasonably decide when confronted by an Englishman in his thirties that it was best
not to grant him another chance at saving his failing business.

Certainty

There does not appear to be a problem in unifying these two types of reasoning to produce a
superior commercial law. By liquidating businesses run by Englishmen in their thirties, the
econometric judge has made the law more effective through the application of relevant
empirical evidence. He also appears to have made the law more certain. That which can be
quantified can also be verified: in order to have been able to count it in the first place you had
to be able to test it. In our example it would not be especially difficult to deduce and test the
age and nationality of the owner of the business. On this basis we can hypothesise a positive
relationship between effectiveness and certainty: the more empirically effective the law is, the
more certain we can be of the outcome before we go to trial:
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Effectiveness

You will recall from the introduction that ‘effectiveness’ here refers to a test based upon
quantifiably significant factor and ‘certainty’ to a test that produces a predictable outcome.
The rest of this paper is intended to demonstrate why this apparently reasonable hypothesis of
a positive relationship is wrong.
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V. The Paradox of Power and Replication
The problem for the judge is that he is making his observations in what is known as a ‘low
power scenario.’ Power is the probability that where a relationship or effect exists, you will
observe it to exist; it is the probability that your statistical test will yield statistically significant
results. You do not need to understand the nuances of power to follow the argument in this
section, beyond that generally something will have a low power where you have a low number
of samples.
A judge is not in a position to evaluate probable outcome as he can only make his observations
in the time honoured fashion: one case at a time. Determining probability requires grouping
things together so that the variables interact. No matter how much gamblers believe in
winning streaks, the chance of a second coin toss being a head is in no way affected by the first.
We will recall that this difference between separation and grouping was a fundamental
difference between deductive legal reasoning and quantitative analysis.
Intuitively, this still feels like it shouldn’t be a problem. If our econometrists have provided
enough data about factors likely to cause failure, then we should be able to use them as
guidelines to help us make consistent decisions. Unfortunately this is where we run into the
paradox of power, described in 1996 by the statistician Ottenbacher when observed that the
“apparently paradoxical conclusion is that the more often we are well guided by theory and
prior observation, but conduct a low power study, the more we decrease the probability of
replication!” 17
The probability of replication he talks about here is the chance that given the same data, the
same facts, we reach the same conclusion. This is another way of asking: how certain is the
test? How likely are we to know the result before we conduct the test? We can show how
Ottenbacher’s paradox might impact upon legal certainty by applying a power test to a
hypothetical model insolvency law.

VI. The Fictional Insolvency Act 2010
Under the Fictional Insolvency Act 2010, any judge who receives a request from a creditor of an
insolvent firm to liquidate the company is given the option to either a) immediately liquidate, or
b) offer a 12 month moratorium during which the company has a chance to fix its problems,
during which time he will not be required to pay his debts.

17

Ottenbacher, “The power of replication and the replication of power”, The American Statistician, Vol 50, No 3
(Aug 1996), 271, 273
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The judge must decide based upon which option is most likely to provide the best returns to
creditors. By the best returns we mean the largest proportion of the outstanding debt.
Although this system is clearly a huge simplification, the ‘best returns to creditors’ standard is
common to most developed insolvency law systems, and credit moratoriums are a common
option within packages of rescue solutions. Remember he can only pick the option most likely
to give the best returns, as he can’t know which one will give the best returns until after he
makes his decision. This will be considered to be a “good” law if it is both effective in providing
the best returns to creditors, and certain so that commerce can model its behaviour
accordingly.
In our model the judge has an either/or decision to make based upon his evaluation of which is
most likely to achieve a particular result. This is as opposed to an either/or decision about
something which has happened in the past or which currently exists, for example; did the
defendant strike the claimant, or does the claimant have title to the property? The two types
of questions have a substantive conceptual difference; the difference between making a
decision about the certain (something that has already happened, however much we may
reconstruct the event in the court), and making a decision about the uncertain (something that
may happen in the future, and which cannot be made to exist until it actually happens). This is
the difference between asking “did Keith win the lottery” and “will Keith win the lottery if he
buys a ticket.” This is important to remember when we come to the maths: we are dealing
with probable outcomes.
Our judge must look at the facts of the case before him, and determine if there is some element
which he recognises as being decisive. It is important to note that this is just a model of a
judge: how a fictional judge might act if the only factors he can consider are repetition and
certainty, and his only method is deduction. This is, of course, not an accurate representation
of how a real life judge makes his decisions, but a technique for illustrating the methodological
clash. We can reproduce the model judge’s dilemma as a diagram.
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success or failure of
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The judge observes the
factor and acts upon it
(P1)
The judge does not
observe the factor and
acts based upon its
absence. (P2)
The judge observes the
factor and acts upon it.
(P3)
The judge does not
observe the factor and
acts upon its absence.
(P4)

We have given our model judge two relationships that he might look for to make his decision.
The first relationship (X) exists in 40% of the cases that the judge evaluates, and is an effective
relationship: it does determine whether the business will succeed or fail.
The second (Y) exists in 5% of the businesses that the judge evaluates, and actually has no
effect on whether the business is better rescued or liquidated. 5% is the standard minimum
acceptable error in social science research, which is to say that if a social scientist observed a
correlation of less than 5% conventionally he would reject it as spurious.
The judge does not know whether these two factors are effective or not. So he will experiment
with both, and choose the one which provides the best replication: the one which appears to
give the most consistent results.
So, which of these tests provides the most legally certain result: the effective or the spurious?
We know that relationship X is causal, and that relationship Y is not. The judge is not so
fortunate as to have this information, so how does he determine which relationship to use? In
social science one groups results together to evaluate them across the whole. A judge must
evaluate one case at a time. This is the difference between a scientist who does one
experiment with two samples, and another who does two experiments with one sample at a
time, or two hundred samples against two hundred separate experiments. The difference
between these two may not be intuitively obvious, but we can demonstrate it mathematically.
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VII. Probability of Replication in Spurious and Non‐Spurious Scenario
Let us compare what happens in two scenarios; the first where the judge looks for the existence
or non‐existence of X, the effective relationship with a 40% correlation, in two cases in a row.

A. SCENARIO 1: PROBABILITY OF REPLICATION WHERE THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP X
P1(reject|E,1) * P1(reject|E,2) = 0.42
= 0.16
P2(¬reject|E,1) * P2(¬reject|E,2) = (1‐0.4)2 = 0.36
= 0.52
What does this mean? We are looking at the probability that looking for relationship X in two
cases in a row will get the same result both times (and thus be “certain”).
This paragraph is for the reader unfamiliar with statistical notation. “P” is probability, and the
number next to it refers to the relevant box on the diagram above. “Reject” is the rather
awkward double negative used in statistics to mean “rejects the null hypothesis”, which is to
say that we reject that the hypothesis is false, or to put it another way, that the relationship
exists. “¬” is the mathematical symbol for “not”, so “¬reject” means “does not reject the null
hypothesis”, which is a triple negative meaning that the relationship has not been observed.
“E” is effect, which means that the relationship is an effective relationship (it is a relationship
where the factors are influencing each other, as opposed to one where two things just happen
to be going on at the same time), and the number after the comma is the number of the
observation. So “P(¬reject|E,2)” means the probability that the observer does not observe an
existing relationship in the second case.
What we see here is that with a 40% chance of observing the phenomena, we have a 52%
chance of getting the same result twice (either two negatives or two positives) if we perform
two observations separately. This is quite different from the 64% chance we have if we
observed the two cases together like a social scientist. Where does this 64% come from?
When you group cases together the probability of observing the phenomena accumulates. So
there is the 40% chance of observation from the first case, and in the other 60% remainder is
another 40% chance of observation (40% of 60 is 24, and our first 40 plus our new 24 is 64).
The difference between two observations at the same time and two observations in a row is
this “12%” – a difference that gets bigger the larger the sample is ‐ because cases observed
together accumulate as evidence, whereas cases analysed separately can only be compared for
consistency. The judge’s inability to accumulate simultaneous data forces him to rely on
separate comparisons of consistency: a court of law is an extremely poor laboratory.

12
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B. SCENARIO 2: PROBABILITY OF REPLICATION BASED ON SPURIOUS RELATIONSHIP Y
P3(reject|¬E,1) * P3(reject|¬E,2) = 0.052
P4(¬reject|¬E,1) * P4(¬reject|¬E,2) = (1‐0.05)2
=

=
0.0025
=
0.9025
0.905

Where we base our decision making on spurious data that is only observed in 5% of cases there
is a 91% chance of replication. Or, to put it another way, the judge finds that making his
decision using observations of a relationship that has no effect (Y) is almost twice as likely to
produce the same result as using his observations of an effective relationship (X) . The spurious
data is more certain than the effective data.

VIII. Impact on Replication of Higher Probable Correlation
The first question you might be asking about this model is this: why only 40%? This may seem
a much less replicable event than, say, the 80% for English insolvents I described in my earlier
example. If we do the mathematics again we find that it doesn’t have as big an impact as we
might expect:

A. PROBABILITY OF REPLICATION OF OBSERVATION OF EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP AT 80% INCIDENCE
P1(reject|E,1) * P1(reject|E,2) = 0.82
= 0.64
P2(¬reject|E,1) * P2(¬reject|E,2) = (1‐0.8)2 = 0.04
= 0.64
This is only 12 points better than the 40% correlation, which is a pretty dismal return for
doubling the chance of observation! It also gives a strong hint as to the actual shape of the
correlation between effectiveness and certainty, and leads us to our next figure that is worth
analysing: a relationship with a 95% chance of being observed. Here, of course, the probability
of repetition is exactly equal. What we have is a practical inversion: the judge acting principally
on an observation of the existence of an effective relationship (and occasionally on when it is
not there) is exactly as certain as the judge acting on the failure to observe a spurious
relationship (and occasionally when it is there). Which means that the judge, left only with
replication as a means to evaluate, still cannot distinguish between the effective and the
spurious. This is not the only problem with the 95% correlation, but before considering that we
should look at the impact of continued replication.

2011]
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IX. Divergence of Probabilities through Repeated Replications
The problem becomes serious as we increase the number of replications (in this model the
number of cases the judge sits on)

A. PROBABILITY OF REPLICATION OVER THREE CASES BASED UPON THE EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP X:
P1(reject|E,1) * P1(reject|E,2) * P1(reject|E,3) = 0.43
P2(¬reject|E,1) * P2(¬reject|E,2) * P2(¬reject|E,3) = (1‐0.4)3

= 0.064
= 0.216
= 0.28

B. PROBABILITY OF REPLICATION OVER THREE CASES BASED UPON THE SPURIOUS RELATIONSHIP Y:
= 0.000125
P3(reject|¬E,1) * P3(reject|¬E,2) * P3(reject|¬E,3) = 0.053
3
P4(¬reject|¬E,1) * P4(¬reject|¬E,2) * P4(¬reject|¬E,3) = ¬(1‐0.05)
= 0.857375
= 0.8575
Although both probabilities have reduced, the spurious relationship is now four times more
likely to be replicated than the effective one. Where the only means of evaluation is replication
the spurious data rapidly becomes more credible: the more cases the judge sees the more the
two relationships probability diverges and the more relatively certain the spurious data
appears.
What does this mean? If we have two judges, one who uses the actual, effective relationship to
determine whether to rescue or liquidate the company, and another who uses the spurious
relationships, then it is the effective judge who will produce uncertain results. Because we only
have replicability to judge the quality of his decisions on, his decisions will appear to be bad.
The other judge, whose decision is based upon a relationship which has nothing to do with
what actually impacts on business failure, produces more predictable results. If a good law is a
certain law, the more spurious the relationship upon which the law is based the better the law
is.

X. Goldfish and Billionaires
It is possible to illustrate this paradox using slightly less mathematics.
A judge sits on insolvency cases.
40% of the time, the business is run by a billionaire and the creditors do better if the business is
rescued.

14
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5% of the time, the business has goldfish in the lobby and the creditors do better if the business
is rescued.
The first one is a real impact; the billionaire owner really helps the creditors. The second one is
spurious; goldfish do not save businesses, although very occasionally rescued businesses have
goldfish.
The judge, however, has no way of knowing which one is or is not spurious, and can only rule
one case at a time, basing his decision on which relationship appears to be most consistent.
In what is known as a “low power” situation, which a court case is the most extreme possible
example of, spurious relationships will repeat more often. This means the judge gets a more
consistent result if he bases his decisions on the existence of goldfish than on the presence of a
billionaire.
This analogy is a rather brutal simplification of the paradox and it is best not to stretch it too
far, so do not spend too much time thinking about which one is the billionaire and which the
goldfish. The root of the problem is to do with contrasting methodologies, not specific
probabilities and types of causal relationship. However, the analogy hopefully makes accessing
the issues more straightforward for readers uncomfortable with the maths.

XI. Is Econometrics still useful for law?
If extrapolate our numbers to illustrate the relationship between effectiveness (testing using
quantifiably significant factors) and certainty (testing to provide predictable results) that we
have discovered, it looks like this:
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This curve shows the relationship between certainty and effectiveness after ten iterations –
after the judge sits on ten cases. The more repetitions occur, the more this U shape broadens,
exacerbating the rapid fall in certainty as we move away from the extremes of effectiveness.
Instead of the positive relationship between effectiveness and certainty that we expected, what
we find is that effective relationships only make certain tests when they occur almost all the
time.
To make matters worse, we should consider that if some factor existed that 95% of the time
could be observed to determine whether a business should be rescued or not, the market
would have adapted to eliminate it; banks do not lend money to the criminally insane, for
example, or to people who are dead. This means that except for the most bizarre cases we
have to practically exclude the extremely effective relationships, leaving only the spurious ones
as highly certain!
Businesses fail for a wide array of rapidly changing reasons, so even if we were able to
accurately map effective correlations for business failure they would not be absolute. Effective
business operates somewhere in the middle of the chart. The reason effective relationships
appear inconsistent is because effective relationships are inconsistent.
Does this mean that we cannot use econometrics to inform legal decision making? The science
of economics has been of immeasurable value to the development of our financial systems: the
problem is not in the economics but how we are trying to use the economics. As Ottenbacher
warns us, “the literature with low statistical power is not only committing a passive error, but
can actually contribute to diverting attention and resources in unproductive directions.”18
If we determine an effective relationship between goldfish and business failure then writing a
law which prohibits the rescue of businesses with goldfish is a practical use of the data. Asking
the judge to determine whether the presence of goldfish is likely to prevent successful business
rescue is not. A law which asks the judge to evaluate if a proposal will probably meet an
external target will not be legally certain, and a law which is legally certain will exclude the
possibility of the judge applying his experience to determine if the ruling is likely to work or not.
The clash between quantitative and deductive method means that we can have law that asks
the judge to apply external knowledge to predict the probable outcome, or law that is legally
certain, but not both at the same time.

18

Ottenbacher, “The power of replication and the replication of power”, The American Statistician, Vol 50, No 3
(Aug 1996), 271, 273
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